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Despite numerous calls for reform and restraint, solitary confinement 
continues to be both misused and overused in Canadian prisons. The 
practice, formally known as administrative segregation under the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, confines prisoners to isolation 
in a cell for up to 23 hours a day.1 The nature of the confinement is harsh: 
prisoners are kept in hostile conditions with no meaningful human 
contact or support. The cells are bare and small, often “painted with the 
excrement, blood, and tortured writings of previous occupants.”2 The 
culture is predominantly one of hostility, humiliation, and abuse.3 
Segregation wages war on body, mind, and soul. Its psychological 
impact is profound, and ranges from psychotic disturbances to 
depression to cognitive disruptions, hallucinations, and perceptual 
distortions.4 Segregation also drives prisoners toward hopelessness, 
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1 S.C. 1992, c. 2 [hereinafter “CCRA”]. 
2 Donald Best, “Solitary confinement is pure torture. I know, I was there”, The Globe and 
Mail (October 30, 2016), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/solitary-confinement-
is-pure-torture-i-know-i-was-there/article32577649/>. 
3 British Columbia Civil Liberties Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] B.C.J. No. 53, 
2018 BCSC 62 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “BCCLA”]. at para. 247; Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 5,  
line 15-18; Interview #8 (July 23, 2015), at 10, line 9. 
4 Id. 
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suicide, and other forms of self-harm.5 The practice is so harmful in its 
effects that the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture has 
declared that solitary confinement amounts to torture when its duration 
exceeds 15 consecutive days.6 
For decades, scholars, advocates, and commissions of inquiry have 
identified core problems with the law and practice of administrative 
segregation, and outlined proposals for reform.7 In January 2018, the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a landmark decision in British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General),  declaring the 
CCRA’s administrative segregation provisions unlawful under sections 7 and 
15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8 The decision marks a sea change 
in Canadian prison law, for a number of reasons. Perhaps most significantly, 
the Court broke from what Lisa Kerr refers to as a “tradition of judicial 
reticence” that has characterized much of prison law to date, by not showing 
extreme deference to the discretionary authority of prison officials.9 Instead, 
the Court engaged in a detailed assessment of the rich evidentiary 
record presented in this case, and recognized the measurable and well-
documented harms waged by segregation. The Court also identified several 
                                                                                                                       
5 See generally: Office of the Correctional Investigator, “Risky Business: An Investigation 
of the Treatment and Management of Chronic Self-Injury Among Federally Sentenced Women” 
(September 30, 2013), online: Office of the Correctional Investigator <http://www.oci-
bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/index-eng.aspx> [hereinafter “Risky Business”]; Office of the Correctional 
Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2010-2011, online: 
<http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/index-eng.aspx>. 
6 Juan E. Mendez, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2011). Online: <http://solitaryconfinement. 
org/uploads/SpecRapTortureAug2011.pdf>, at para. 76 [hereinafter “Mendez”]. 
7 See, e.g., Michael Jackson, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); Michael Jackson, “The Litmus Test of Legitimacy: 
Independent Adjudication and Administrative Segregation” (2006) 48 (2) Canadian Journal of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 157-196; Louise Arbour, Commission of Inquiry into Certain 
Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston, Catalogue No. JS42-73/1996E (Ottawa: Public Works 
and Government Services Canada, 1996) [hereinafter “Arbour”]; Correctional Service of Canada, 
Coroner’s Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith (Ottawa: CSC, 2013); Lisa C. Kerr, “The 
Chronic Failure to Control Prisoner Isolation in US and Canadian Law” (2015) 40:2 Queen’s L.J. 
483-530 [hereinafter “Kerr, ‘Chronic Failure’”]. See also BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 40. 
8 BCCLA, id., at paras. 609-610 (also granting a 12-month suspension of invalidity) citing 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. See also Canadian Civil Liberties 
Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] O.J. No. 6592, 2017 ONSC 7491 (Ont. S.C.J.) 
(declaring aspects of the administrative regime unconstitutional). 
9 Lisa Kerr, “B.C. solitary ruling: A bold move that may finally bring about change”, The 
Globe and Mail (January 18, 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/bc-solitary-
ruling-a-bold-move-that-may-finally-bring-about-change/article37656159/>. 
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important criteria for ensuring the constitutionality of administrative 
segregation, including the fundamental need for independent oversight and 
clear time limits.10 
Even with these safeguards firmly in place – assuming they are 
effectively implemented and adhered to – potential for misuse will still 
exist. Correctional Service Canada (CSC) has long been criticized for its 
non-compliance with basic rights safeguards in the administration of 
corrections, as well as for its hostile corporate culture and disregard for the 
rule of law, particularly in matters of segregation.11 It is therefore likely that 
even if the BCCLA decision is upheld and the government enacts a new, 
constitutionally sound legislative regime, prisoners will continue to suffer 
rights violations in segregation. In this paper, I chart a path through which 
to address such violations.  
To do so, I turn away from Charter law and toward the law of torts, and 
the tort of false imprisonment in particular. This analysis is new: while some 
scholars have examined how other branches of tort law can address harms 
caused by solitary confinement, none have examined the application of this 
tort.12 I argue that when advanced against the backdrop of BCCLA, the tort 
of false imprisonment provides segregated prisoners with an effective means 
through which to seek compensation for individual harm. I restrict my 
analysis to the tort of false imprisonment for two main reasons. First, as an 
intentional tort that is actionable per se, false imprisonment does not impose 
onerous evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs. Rather, the heavy lifting must be 
done by government: once the plaintiff proves complete confinement, it falls 
on CSC to demonstrate that the confinement was legally justified. This 
evidentiary distribution is well-suited to address the profound imbalance of 
power between plaintiffs and defendants in the prison setting. Second, since 
the tort of false imprisonment is designed to prevent unwarranted intrusions 
on liberty, dignity, and personal autonomy, it can effectively respond to the 
harms that are typically suffered in segregation. The tort allows prisoners to 
bring individualized evidence of harm, and to seek remedies for both 
tangible and intangible losses.13 If substantial awards are issued, the 
                                                                                                                       
10 BCCLA, supra, note 3, at paras. 410 and 566. 
11 See, e.g., Arbour, supra, note 7, at 39. See also BCCLA, id., at paras. 37-40. 
12 For an analysis of how the law of negligence can apply in the prison setting, see Adelina 
Iftene, Lynne Hanson & Allan Manson, “Tort Claims and Canadian Prisoners” (2014) 39:2 
Queen’s L.J. 655-683. 
13 For a thoughtful analysis of how victims of violence might benefit from bringing tort 
claims, see Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Protecting the Dignity and Autonomy of Women: Rethinking 
the Place of Constructive Consent in the Tort of Sexual Battery” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 3-61, at 3-4 
[hereinafter “Adjin-Tettey, ‘Protecting the Dignity’”]. 
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financial burden might compel much needed change in culture and daily 
management of segregation. 
Despite this promise, the tort’s progressive potential has yet to be 
realized. As currently applied, the tort does not subject CSC to rigorous 
scrutiny. In fact, the courts have shown significant deference to CSC’s 
discretionary authority, even in the face of evidence that such authority 
was improperly exercised. In addition, even in successful cases, the 
courts have issued only paltry general damage awards, generally set at 
$10 for every day of unlawful segregation. The courts have justified this 
approach by stating that a prisoner’s liberty interests are simply not 
worth as much as those of the free. This approach is problematic not only 
for its failure to appreciate the profound harm caused by segregation, but 
also, as I explain in more detail below, for its unprincipled departure 
from the doctrine that governs the tort of false imprisonment. 
In what follows, I sketch the law and practice of administrative 
segregation in Canadian prisons to provide context for discussion. This 
sketch builds on key findings made by the Court in BCCLA. It also 
incorporates data obtained from interviews with advocates, lawyers, and 
other professionals who have worked with segregated inmates in Canadian 
federal prisons, all conducted in the course of this research.14 My goal in 
incorporating this data is to present a more realistic picture of the lived 
experience of segregation, including the contours and dark corners that are 
rarely visible from an analysis restricted to cases alone. This is critical for 
understanding the harms at issue in such cases, and tort law’s ability to 
address them. I then turn to examine the tort of false imprisonment, 
analyzing six decisions that have applied this tort to claims involving 
administrative segregation. Highlighting the two central problems noted 
above, I develop my critique by analyzing the prison cases vis-à-vis false 
imprisonment cases involving the unincarcerated. I conclude by 
highlighting the tort of false imprisonment’s immense progressive 
potential to effectively respond to the harms caused by segregation, and 
urge the need for reform. 
                                                                                                                       
14 This project focused only on administrative segregation in federal prisons, and did not 
consider segregation in provincial prisons. Interviews were conducted with a total of 20 advocates  
and legal professionals in British Columbia and  with representatives of the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator in Ottawa. Interviews were conducted in accordance with ethics criteria established by  
the University of British Columbia Office of Research Services, Behavioural Research Ethics Board. 
See Ethics Approval Certificate H15-00995. Research ethics review is a process of initial and ongoing 
review and monitoring of research involving human participants. The process requires the independent 
evaluation of all proposed research by an independent committee. For more information, see online: 
<http://www.rise.ubc.ca/content/human-ethics>. 
(2018) 84 S.C.L.R. (2d) TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT 47 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION: AN OVERVIEW 
The CCRA outlines two forms of segregation. The first, known as 
disciplinary segregation, is fairly well circumscribed: it can only be 
imposed for serious disciplinary offences following a hearing before an 
independent decision-maker and is subject to a 30-day maximum.15 The 
second, known as administrative segregation, is more discretionary in its 
application and often more harmful in its effects.16 Administrative 
segregation confines prisoners to a cell for 23 hours a day with little to 
no human contact, and has been recognized by the courts as a form of 
solitary confinement.17    
In its current iteration, the CCRA grants prison officials vast 
discretionary leeway in virtually all matters relating to administrative 
segregation.18 For example, the CCRA empowers institutional heads to 
segregate prisoners based only on a “reasonable belief” that a prisoner 
has acted, attempted, or intends to act in a manner that threatens the 
safety of the institution or any person within it; allowing a prisoner to 
associate with others could interfere with an investigation; or allowing a 
prisoner to associate with others would jeopardize the inmate’s safety.19 
In practice, these grounds are so broadly worded that prison officials can 
segregate prisoners on a whim without any meaningful accountability or 
oversight. Also, the CCRA does not prescribe clear time limits on 
segregation, and empowers prison officials to segregate prisoners for 
indefinite periods of time.20 Notwithstanding the United Nations’ 
                                                                                                                       
15 CCRA, supra, note 1, ss. 44(1)(f), 41(2). 
16 Id., ss. 31-33 and 37. See also Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, 
SOR 92/620, ss. 19-23. 
17 BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 137; Bacon v. Surrey Pretrial Services Centre (Warden), 
[2010] B.C.J. No. 1080, 2010 BCSC 805, at para. 6 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Hill, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1255, 
148 D.L.R. (4th) 337, at para. 18 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”]. 
18 CCRA, supra, note 1. 
19 Id., s. 31(3) 
20 Bill C-56, introduced by the Federal Government in 2017 proposes non-binding time limits 
and independent external review. The time limits are initially to be set at 21 days and then reduced to 15 
days 18 months after the amendments come into force. If an institutional head orders continued 
segregation beyond these limits, an independent external reviewer must review the case (s. 35.2(1)(a)). 
The reviewer must also review cases of prisoners who have already been segregated on three prior 
occasions or for 90 cumulative days in the calendar year (s. 35.2(1)(b)-(c)). The reviewer lacks real 
power, however, and merely makes recommendations to the institutional head. Ultimately, the warden 
is not compelled by law to release prisoners after the specified time limits. The warden remains the final 
decision-maker, and retains all of the existing powers outlined in the CCRA (s. 35.3(1)). Notably as 
well, while  the CCRA does not impose clear time limits on administrative segregation, it does require 
periodic review, mandating a first review within one working day of placement, a second within five 
days of placement, and at least one every 30 days thereafter. See CCRA, id., ss. 20-21. These reviews 
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position that solitary confinement amounts to torture when it extends 
more than 15 consecutive days,21 it is not unusual for prisoners in Canada 
— particularly the vulnerable and the Indigenous — to be isolated for far 
longer periods of time. Edward Snowshoe, for example, spent 162 days 
in segregation before taking his own life.22 Adam Capay spent over four 
years in segregation, isolated in a plexiglass box with lights always on, 
Kinew James spent six years in segregation and Timothy Nome over 12 
years.23 One prisoner whose identity CSC has not revealed was held in 
administrative segregation for over 17 years, for a total of 6,273 days.24  
The Court in BCCLA recognized that the conditions of confinement 
in segregation “are vastly different” from those of the general 
population.25 Citing a number of inmate witnesses, the Court described 
the cells as small and filthy, with walls “splattered with feces and 
smeared with food, nasal mucus, and other bodily fluid.”26 Justin Piché 
and Karine Major paint a similar picture. Their analysis of prisoners’ 
writing on solitary confinement describes time spent in “the hole” as 
characterized by a lack of stimuli, lack of space, loss of personal 
possessions, limited clothing, bad and monotonous food, lack of 
exercise, limited fresh air, inadequate time and facilities for bathing, 
poor ventilation in the summer, and inadequate insulation in the 
winter.27 The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project 
described similar conditions of confinement.28 According to interview 
participants, segregation cells in Canadian prisons are filthy, often 
                                                                                                                       
are not independent in fact or in law, and are often superficial in nature. For example, in R. v. Hamm, 
[2016] A.J. No. 803, 2016 ABQB 440 (Alta. Q.B.), the Court noted that one prisoner’s fifth working 
day review took a mere 12 minutes and failed to “deal with the reason or basis for segregation” (at 
paras. 23, 73). The review was “merely perfunctory” (at para. 96). 
21 Mendez, supra, note 6. 
22 BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 44. 
23 Martin Patriquin, “Why Adam Capay has spent 1,560 days in solitary”, MacLean’s 
(November 2, 2016), online: <http://www.macleans.ca/news/why-adam-capay-has-spent-1560-days-
in-solitary/> [hereinafter “Patriquin”]; Paul Darrow, “Solitary confinement: How four people’s 
stories have changed hearts, minds, and laws on the issue”, The Globe and Mail (June 20, 2017), 
online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/solitary-confinement-canada-required-reading 
/article35391601/>. 
24 BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 155. 
25 Id., at para. 110. 
26 Id., at 114. 
27 Justin Piché and Karine Major, “Prisoner Writing in/on Solitary Confinement: 
Contributions from the Journal of Prisoners on Prisons, 1988-2013” (2015) 4:1 Canadian Journal of 
Human Rights 3, at 22-23 [hereinafter “Piché and Major”]. 
28 Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 14, lines 2-3; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 19, 
lines 16-19. 
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soiled with blood or feces.29 Cleaning supplies are provided 
infrequently, which can drive prisoners to use or destroy their own 
clothing to clean their cell.30 While interview participants noted that 
CSC provides segregated prisoners with a mop and bucket on cleaning 
days, they also noted that by the time the bucket reaches the last person 
in the unit, the water is cold, dirty, and ineffective.31 Others noted that 
CSC has also been known to keep prisoners in cells that are deemed to 
be a biohazard for unnecessary lengths of time, or to segregate 
prisoners in cells containing asbestos that have been deemed too 
dangerous to enter.32  
Segregated prisoners are isolated in almost every way possible. 
Physically, segregation units are often isolated from other areas of the 
institution.33 Socially, segregated prisoners have either no meaningful 
contact, or very limited contact, with other prisoners and guards.34 There 
are few opportunities for prisoners to call loved ones or meet with 
family.35 Often, they are reduced to communicating with guards and 
service providers like elders and teachers through the meal slot in their 
cell door, a practice the Court in BCCLA ruled should be “terminated 
forever.”36 The intensity of this kind of isolation results in feelings of 
profound loneliness and dehumanization. Justin Piché and Karen Major 
cite one prisoner’s account, as follows:  
Banishment to isolation is like flaking off the end of the earth. You become 
an inanimate object and are treated like garbage rotting at the dump. I spent 
five months on the fourth tier by myself, never seeing other prisoners…. 
Guards strictly enforce the silent treatment…. The months pile up and you 
begin to lose touch with reality. All you know is the hole.37 
Segregated prisoners are effectively cut off from all forms of assistance. 
They have little access to support services and programming.38 Psychiatric 
                                                                                                                       
29 Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 10, lines 2-5, 12-16, at 11, lines 2-8 and 13-25. 
30 Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at lines 9-17. 
31 Interview #2 (June 19, 2015), at 5, lines 21-25; Interview #4 , id., at 10, lines 1-3, 11, 
lines 13-25. 
32 Interview #4, id., at 10, lines 2-5, 12-16, at 11, lines 2-8 and 13-25. 
33 Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 6, lines 21-25. 
34 BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 133. See also Piché and Major, supra, note 27, at 18. 
35 Interview #5 (June 9, 2015), at 19, line 8; Interview #6 (June 10, 2015) at 11, line 13; 
Interview #7 (June 24, 2015), at 9, lines 18-20; Interview #6, id., at 11, lines 20-24; Interview #3 
(June 18, 2015), at 5, lines 10-14. 
36 BCCLA, supra, note 3, at paras. 129, 138-139, 149. 
37 Piché and Major, supra, note 27, at 27. 
38 BCCLA, supra, note 3, at paras. 130-132. See also: Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 21, 
lines 21-23, at 22, lines 7-8. 
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support is either unavailable, or is sporadic and superficial.39 Requests for 
mental health support often go unanswered due to indifference or limited 
resources.40 The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project also 
described such support as being principally aimed not at care, but at risk 
assessment.41 As a result, prisoners are often reluctant to disclose their true 
feelings or conditions, for fear that their candour would be used against 
them.42 Some prisoners may be cut off or denied medication while in 
segregation for security reasons.43 Spiritual support and other 
programming is either forbidden or difficult to access.44 The isolation is 
intense and extreme, and can turn people “into ghosts”.45  
The harmful effects of administrative segregation have been well-
documented.46 As Piché and Major maintain, segregation “reduces 
human beings to a brutalizing, degrading, dehumanizing, lonely and 
meager existence.”47 Juan Mendez, the United Nations’ Special 
Rapporteur on Torture has stated that “solitary confinement is a harsh 
measure which may cause serious psychological and physiological 
adverse effects on individuals regardless of their specific conditions”.48 
Mendez explains that the practice can lead to psychotic disturbances, 
anxiety, depression, anger, cognitive disturbances, hallucinations, and 
perceptual distortions.49 Segregation can drive prisoners towards 
aggressive and anti-social behaviour, including psychosis, panic, rage, 
insomnia, self-mutilation, and other forms of self-harm.50 The research, 
                                                                                                                       
39 Id. 
40 Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 24, lines 6-25; Interview #9 (July 24, 2015), at 31, 
lines 22-23. 
41 Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 10, lines 5-10; Interview #6 (June 10, 2015), at 5, line 25, 
page 10, lines 5-10. See also BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 595. 
42 BCCLA, id., at para. 295. See also: Interview #1 (July 20, 2015), at 32, lines 2-5; 
Interview #6 (June 10, 2015), at 5, lines 8-10. 
43 Interview #6 (June 10, 2015), at 4, line 18, at 14, lines 21-24; Interview #4 (June 19, 
2015), at 21, line 7. 
44 Interview #4, id., at 30, lines 1-9; Interview #6, id., at 5, lines 8-19; Interview #9 (July 24, 
2015), at 22, lines 23-25, at 23, lines 5-6, 15-24; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 25, lines 7-8. 
45 Michael Jackson, “Reflections on 40 Years of Advocacy to End the Isolation of Canadian 
Prisoners” (2015) 4:1 Canadian Journal of Human Rights 57, at 85. 
46 BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 247. 
47 Piché and Major, supra, note 27, at 23-24. 
48 Mendez, supra, note 6, at para. 79. 
49 Id., at para. 62. 
50 As the Court concluded in BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 247, administrative segregation 
places prisoners 
at significant risk of serious psychological harm, including mental pain and suffering, and 
increased incidence of self-harm and suicide. Some of the specific harms include anxiety, 
withdrawal, hypersensitivity, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control, irritability, 
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as well as the Court in BCCLA, has found that suicide is “proportionately 
more prevalent amongst inmates in segregation.”51  
As the Court further recognized in BCCLA, the harms of segregation 
are particularly egregious when the practice is waged against the 
mentally ill.52 The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project 
stated the same, and further noted that long-term segregation can often 
aggravate mental health problems.53 These accounts are consistent with 
the findings of the Office of the Correctional Investigator, which noted in 
its 2009-2010 Annual Report that segregation often exacerbates 
underlying mental health issues.54 Prisoners who struggle with mental 
illness in segregation “are often viewed as manipulative and malingering, 
and their behaviours contrived attempts to compromise security”.55 As a 
result, mental illness is perceived as a heightened risk that can be used to 
justify further segregation.56 As Kerr notes, for this reason, mentally ill 
prisoners are more likely to be targeted for, rather than protected from, 
administrative segregation. In Kerr’s analysis, segregation is a technique 
that “is often used by prison officials to punish and contain the irritating 
and the unwell.”57  
                                                                                                                       
aggression, rage, paranoia, hopelessness, a sense of impending emotional breakdown, self-
mutilation, and suicidal ideation and behaviour. 
See also, e.g.: Stuart Grassian, “Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement” (2006) 22:3 J.L. & 
Pol’y 325; Craig Haney, “Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and ‘Supermax’ Confinement” 
(2003) 49:1 Crime & Delinquency 124; Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, “Regulating Prisons of the Future: 
A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement” (1997) 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc 
Change 477; Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, “Effects of Sensory Deprivation in Psychiatric, 
Seclusion and Solitary Confinement” (1986) 8 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 49. 
51 BCCLA, id., at para. 264. 
52 Id., at para. 247. 
53 Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 13, lines 6-13; Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 11, 
lines 3-19; Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 23, lines 8-12; Interview #5 (June 9, 2015), at 6, lines 
11-25; Interview #6, (June 10, 2016), at 16, lines 8-25; Interview #7 (June 24, 2015), at 5, lines 3-5; 
Interview #9 (July 24, 2015), at 15, lines 5-10 and 34, lines 10-14; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), 
at 21, lines 14-17. See also Lisa Coleen Kerr, “The Origins of Unlawful Prison Policies” (2015) 4:1 
Canadian Journal of Human Rights 89; Craig Haney, supra, note 51. 
54 Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator 2009-2010 (June 30, 2010), online: Office of the Correctional Investigator <http://www.oci-
bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/index-eng.aspx>, at 13. For federally sentenced women in particular, segregation 
placements made in response to incidents of self-harm often exacerbate distress, which leads to an 
increase in self-injury or to resistive and combative behaviours. See Risky Business, supra, note 5, at 20. 
55 Naomi Moses and Amy Carter, Solitary Confinement in Canadian Prisons: Tort Law as a 
Platform for Change (2015), Unpublished, on file with the Author, at 9 [hereinafter “Moses and Carter”]. 
See also Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 12, lines 7-12; Interview #6, (June 10, 2016), at 3, lines 2-7. 
56 Interview #9 (July 24, 2015), at 26, lines 10-15. 
57 Kerr, “Chronic Failure”, supra, note 7, at 496-97. 
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The psychological impact of segregation is compounded by the 
indeterminacy of segregation placements. In BCCLA, the Court noted 
that the indeterminacy of segregation “is a particularly problematic 
feature that exacerbates its painfulness, increases frustration, and 
intensifies the depression and hopelessness that is often generated in the 
restrictive environments that characterize segregation.”58 The lawyers 
and advocates interviewed for this project similarly described the sense 
of extreme hopelessness and desperation prisoners experienced as a 
result of not knowing when — or whether — their segregation placement 
will end.59 One stated:  
I think that is actually the most torturous part of that experience is just not 
being able to look ahead. Not being able to plan. Not being able to see a 
future. We really need that as human beings. We want to know, you know 
what’s going to happen today and then what’s going to happen tomorrow 
and what choices to make. Without having any future which you can cope 
or count on with anything to do, just unravels you as a human being.60 
These accounts are consistent with research suggesting that the 
indeterminacy of segregation does violence to the mind.61 Michael Jackson 
describes segregation’s indeterminacy as the “ultimate horror”, stating that 
people “cannot tolerate a situation in which there seems to be no escape”.62 
BobbyLee Worm, who was segregated for over three years, described this 
time as a blur of depression and psychological deterioration. In her words, 
segregation makes you feel like “you are losing your mind…. Days turn 
into nights and into days and you don’t know if you’ll ever get out”.63  
Time spent in segregation is characterized by “mindlessly boring 
inactivity, and a lack of stimulation.”64 The mental strain is so severe that 
many turn to self-harm as a pastime.65 While legislation entitles 
segregated prisoners to at least one “hour out” for every 24-hour 
                                                                                                                       
58 Supra, note 3, at para. 248. 
59 Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 17, lines 23-25; Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 14, lines 21-25; 
Interview #8 (July 23, 2015), at 35, line 20; Interview #9 (July 25, 2015), at 31, line 6. 
60 Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 40, lines 7-17. 
61 See, e.g., Lisa Guenther, Solitary Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), at 196. 
62 Michael Jackson cited in Marion Botsford Fraser, “Life on the Installment Plan: 
Is Canada’s penal system for women making or breaking Renée Acoby”, The Walrus (March 2010), 
online: <https://thewalrus.ca/life-on-the-instalment-plan/>. 
63 Patriquin, supra, note 23. 
64 Moses and Carter, supra, note 55, at 8. See also Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 28, lines 7-10. 
65 Piché and Major, supra, note 27. 
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period,66 some prisoners are denied the opportunity to spend this time 
outdoors or in contact with others.67 In some cases, CSC requires 
prisoners to use this time to conduct personal business such as 
showering, cleaning, or making phone calls, leaving little time for human 
contact, fresh air, or exercise.68 In such circumstances, as Naomi Moses 
and Amy Carter explain, the hour out offers “little reprieve from the 
austere environment of segregation.”69 On occasion, CSC takes 
deliberate steps to sabotage a prisoner’s hour out. One interview 
participant described a case in which prison staff purposefully gave a 
segregated prisoner coffee, turned off the heat, and left the lights on all 
night to prevent sleep, which caused that prisoner to sleep through their 
hour out the following day.70 
Such conduct is not unusual in the context of administrative segregation. 
The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project described the culture 
of segregation as one of abuse and humiliation.71 Segregation is often 
deployed as a punitive measure or a raw exercise of power, used to degrade, 
demean, or control.72 Interview participants recounted scenarios in which 
CSC staff tampered with food, left lights on or off all day, or banged on 
doors to aggravate prisoners.73 Two interview participants described 
scenarios of segregation staff providing prisoners with razor blades and 
telling them to kill themselves.74 One participant described a disturbing 
incident where a prisoner returned to his cell from the shower to find a 
noose, with staff reportedly telling him that they had “set him up”.75 
Another described an example of a male Muslim prisoner, who, contrary to 
policy, was strip-searched in the presence of a female staff member and 
with significant unnecessary commentary before his placement in 
segregation; he was then released soon after, suggesting that the experience 
                                                                                                                       
66 Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR 92/620, s. 83(2)(d): “The Service 
shall take all reasonable steps to ensure the safety of every inmate and that every inmate is … (d) 
given the opportunity to exercise for at least one hour every day outdoors, weather permitting, or 
indoors where the weather does not permit exercising outdoors.” 
67 Interview #11 (August 7, 2015). 
68 Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 18, lines 10-12. 
69 Moses and Carter, supra, note 55. 
70 Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 11, lines 13-25. 
71 Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 5, lines 15-18; Interview #8 (July 23, 2015), at 10, line 9. 
72 Interview #8, id., at 10, lines 8-10. See also BCCLA, supra, note 3, at para. 48. 
73 Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 6, lines 2-4; Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 22, 
lines 22-24; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 10, lines 8-13. 
74 Interview #2, id., at 6, lines 17-22; Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 4, lines 3-8. 
75 Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 22, lines 16-17. 
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was designed solely to degrade.76 Since segregation units are often isolated 
away from the oversight of other staff and fellow prisoners, segregation 
staff can more easily engage in abusive behaviour without consequence.77  
While prison culture generally discourages prisoners from speaking 
out against abuse, those who wish to do so have few options available to 
them. The internal complaints process is largely ineffective: even when 
prisoners report abuse, most complaints are dismissed as incredulous.78 
Outside the internal process, prisoners may challenge segregation orders 
through habeas corpus applications, but this remedy only provides 
release and does not compensate for harm. It is also not uncommon for 
CSC to transfer or release segregated prisoners if a habeas application is 
advanced, which can render the matter moot.79 As Moses and Carter 
explain, CSC’s ability to “quickly shift the sands” denies a prisoner the 
opportunity to seek accountability, such that the “potentially empowering 
quality of the legal remedy is rendered hollow”.80 While prisoners may 
seek more expansive remedies through judicial review, access to justice 
barriers make these remedies difficult to access.81 Prisoners may also 
face a host of additional barriers when seeking justice. As Kerr clarifies:  
[n]ormal delays in court proceedings often make cases moot, and the 
federal Correctional Service settles viable cases before hearing and 
insists on non-disclosure clauses. It is also difficult to access penal 
institutions and even more difficult to access isolation units.82  
When cases do go forward courts generally take a “hands-off” 
approach to reviews of correctional decision-making, and grant 
considerable deference to the discretionary authority of CSC.83 
                                                                                                                       
76 Interview #8 (July 23, 2015), at 28, lines 4-25, at 29, lines 2-10. See also CCRA supra, 
note 1, s. 48: 
A staff member of the same sex as the inmate may conduct a routine strip search of an 
inmate, without individualized suspicion, 
(a) in the prescribed circumstances, which circumstances must be limited to situations in 
which the inmate has been in a place where there was a likelihood of access to 
contraband that is capable of being hidden on or in the body; or 
(b) when the inmate is entering or leaving a segregation area. 
77 Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 20, lines 16-19; Interview #4 (June 19, 2015), at 5, 
lines 16-18; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 6, lines 22-26, at 7, lines 1-4, at 10, line 3. 
78 Interview #4, id., at 9, lines 9-13. 
79 Interview #15 (July 10, 2015). 
80 Moses and Carter, supra, note 55, at 5. 
81 Kerr, “Chronic Failure”, supra, note 7.    
82 Id. 
83 Id. See also Allan Manson, “Solitary Confinement, Remission and Prison Discipline” 
(1990) 75 Crim. Rep. (3d) 356, at 357. 
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By turning to tort law, prisoners can potentially gain access to 
remedies that administrative and public law are ill-suited to address.  
A tort claim can respond to the changing circumstances of a prisoner, and 
will not be rendered moot by virtue of release or transfer.84 Tort hearings 
also allow prisoners to present evidence of harm, which is critical for 
recognizing the lived experience of administrative segregation. The 
benefits of tort litigation do not end there. As Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey 
notes, findings of liability in tort “not only constitute a formal and public 
recognition of plaintiffs’ victimization and perpetrator responsibility for 
victimization”, they also have broader therapeutic benefits.85 In the 
context of administrative segregation, tort litigation might provide 
prisoners with some measure of vindication or psychological relief. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, a tort claim can result in 
individualized damage rewards to compensate a plaintiff for harms 
suffered in segregation. As noted briefly above, however, the false 
imprisonment cases that have been decided to date have failed to achieve 
tort law’s progressive potential.  
III. APPLYING THE TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT 
The tort of false imprisonment is relatively easy to establish: the 
claim is actionable per se once the plaintiff proves a total confinement 
imposed in a direct and intentional manner without lawful 
justification.86 There must be a “total restraint” on the liberty of the 
plaintiff, imposed either by physical confinement or threat of force.87 
As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in Frey v. Fedoruk, the 
burden is not an onerous one to discharge: the plaintiff “need not 
prove that the imprisonment was unlawful or malicious, but 
establishes a prima facie case if he proves that he was imprisoned by 
the defendant”.88 Originally designed to protect disenfranchised serfs, 
                                                                                                                       
84 Interview #15 (July 10, 2015).  
85 Adjin-Tettey, “Protecting the Dignity” supra, note 13, at 4. See also Elizabeth 
Adjin-Tettey, “Righting Past Wrongs Through Contextualization: Assessing Claims of Aboriginal 
Survivors of Historical and Institutional Abuses” (2007) 25(1) Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice 95. 
86 Bird v. Jones (1845), 7 Q.B. 742; Frey v. Fedoruk et al., [1950] S.C.J. No. 21, [1950] 
S.C.R. 517, at 524 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Frey”]. See also Philip Osborne, The Law of Torts, 5th ed. 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015), at 272 [hereinafter “Osborne”]; Alan Calnan, Justice and Tort Law 
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1997), at 166. 
87 Id. 
88 Frey, supra, note 86, at 523-24, citing Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2d ed., Vol. 33, at 38. 
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in its contemporary application the tort acts as a check on unlawful 
use of power and is often used to contest improper treatment at the 
hands of police officers, security guards, and other similarly situated 
defendants.89 While a number of defences can be raised to dispute 
liability in false imprisonment, the most common is proof of the 
proper exercise e of legal authority, which provides a complete 
defence.90 
While the common law has recognized that prisoners can make claims 
of false imprisonment since 1835, Canadian courts only began to apply 
the tort in the prison context in the early 1990s.91 The courts initially 
refused to allow segregated prisoners to bring false imprisonment claims, 
on the rationale that the tort should only protect the liberty of those who 
are already free. The British Columbia Court of Appeal definitively 
rejected this proposition in R. v. Hill,92 reasoning that administrative 
segregation does more than simply confine a prisoner to one part of the 
prison. Rather, in keeping with the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
statements in Martineau v. Matsqui Institution, the Court recognized that 
administrative segregation constitutes a “prison within a prison” and 
deprives prisoners of residual liberty interests.93 Hill provides that where 
lawful authority is lacking or where negligence is found, administrative 
segregation amounts to false imprisonment and is actionable as such. 
Despite the fact that annual segregation placements number in the 
thousands, there are only eight reported decisions involving false 
imprisonment claims arising from placement in segregation.94 Of those, two 
                                                                                                                       
89 Robert M. Solomon et al, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts, 8th ed. (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2011), at 70-73. 
90 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, “Tort” (2012 Reissue). 
91 Early cases, such as Osborne v. Angle, [1835] 2 Scott 500 and Yorke v. Chapman, [1839] 10 
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92 Hill, supra, note 17. 
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S.C.J. No. 121, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, at 622, 625 (S.C.C.). 
94 These are: Abbott v. Canada, [1993] F.C.J. No. 673, 64 F.T.R. 81 (Fed. T.D.) [hereinafter 
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[hereinafter “McArthur”]; Grenier v. Canada, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1778, 2005 FCA 348 (F.C.A.) 
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Robinson v. Canada, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1524, 120 F.T.R. 157 (Fed. T.D.) [hereinafter “Robinson”]; 
Brandon v. Canada (Correctional Service), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1, 105 F.T.R. 243 (Fed. T.D.) [hereinafter 
“Brandon”]; Saint-Jacques v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1991] F.C.J. No. 306, 45 F.T.R. 1  
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were decided on the basis of jurisdictional matters, and only six were 
decided on substantive grounds.95 While this data set is small, the cases 
articulate several principles that shed light on the legalities of solitary 
confinement. Brandon v. Canada, for example, establishes that CSC must 
provide valid justification both for the initial placement decision and the 
decision to keep the prisoner segregated.96 Saint Jacques v. Canada 
prescribes that the reasons given for placing a prisoner in segregation must 
be substantiated by evidence or documentation, and that a failure to 
periodically review the segregation order will lead to a finding of liability in 
tort.97 Hill reaffirms the principle that prison officials may be liable for 
negligence and false imprisonment for failing to review an inmate’s 
segregation order.98 This case also reinforces the long established principle 
that false imprisonment does not require bad faith and is actionable per se.99 
Canada (AG) v. McArthur, the only case from this data set to be heard at the 
Supreme Court of Canada, held that prisoners can advance civil claims in 
provincial superior courts rather than seek judicial review to overturn 
administrative orders.100 While these principles are valuable in marking the 
legalities of administrative segregation, two far more striking patterns 
emerge from the few reported cases decided to date, as noted briefly above. 
First, when applying the tort, courts have shown remarkable deference to  
the decision-making authority of prison officials, even when facing evidence 
indicating that such authority was improperly exercised. Second, courts have 
awarded only paltry general damage awards to compensate for unlawful and 
excessive segregation placements. I examine each of these in turn.  
                                                                                                                       
(Fed. T.D.) [hereinafter “Saint-Jacques”]. Five of these cases combine false imprisonment claims with 
negligence (Abbott, Caron, Hill, McArthur, Robinson). Of these five cases, one (McArthur) includes a 
claim of negligent infliction of emotional and mental distress. Two of these eight cases also involve 
Charter claims (Robinson and McArthur), and one (Grenier) also involves assault. One case also 
combines defamation, conspiracy, abuse of authority claims (Robinson); and one (Abbott) includes 
claims of battery, assault, and cruel and unusual punishment (non-Charter). Five of these cases were 
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95 These cases are: Abbott, id.; Brandon, id.; Grenier, id.; Hill, id.; Saint-Jacques, id.; and Caron, 
id.; though Caron did not conceptually separate the claims in negligence and false imprisonment.  
Two cases were decided based on jurisdictional issues (Robinson, id., and McArthur, id.). 
96 Brandon, id. 
97 Saint-Jacques, supra, note 94. 
98 Hill, supra, note 17. 
99 Id. 
100 See McArthur, supra, note 94. 
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IV. EXTENDING UNDUE DEFERENCE TO PRISON AUTHORITIES 
While Brandon prescribes that CSC must provide valid justification for 
an initial segregation placement decision, the reported cases have shown 
remarkable deference to the discretionary whims of prison officials when 
applying this standard.101 In Abbott, for example, the plaintiff was maced 
and shot by guards after placing a butter knife into a garbage can during an 
altercation between a guard and another inmate.102 CSC segregated the 
plaintiff for his alleged “involvement” in the incident, despite not having 
any evidence that linked him to the altercation at hand. In its review of the 
evidence, the Federal Court found that CSC had no basis to suspect  
the plaintiff’s involvement, stating unequivocally: “Literally from day  
one the prison authorities knew that Abbott was not involved.”103 
Nonetheless, the Court found that his segregation placement was justified, 
since “no clear determination could be made” while the investigation into 
the incident was in progress.104 The decision not to impose liability in this 
case is striking, as it seems to contradict the court’s own evidentiary 
finding. Similarly, in Hill, which involved a prisoner held in remand and 
placed in segregated custody under the British Columbia legislative 
scheme, the prison authorities segregated the plaintiff for his alleged 
involvement in a prison riot.105 As with Abbott, there was no specific 
evidence that the plaintiff had participated in the riot.106 Remarkably, in 
both these cases, the courts did not endorse the outcome that the law and 
the evidence mandated: they accepted that prison officials acted wrongly, 
but declined to impose liability. Put another way, they refused to hold CSC 
accountable for the harms caused by their conduct despite evidence that 
prison officials segregated plaintiffs for unsubstantiated reasons. 
These decisions stray from the approach taken in other false 
imprisonment settings. At its core, the legal authority defence asks for 
                                                                                                                       
101 See Brandon, supra, note 94. This pattern is not unique to tort law. In the context of 
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concrete proof that authority was properly exercised. Outside the prison 
context, this standard has been applied with rigour. In the case of police 
arrests, for example, the defence requires police to demonstrate that the 
arrest was made on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds that are 
objectively justifiable.107 In other words, a reasonable person placed in 
the officer’s position must be able to conclude that there were in fact 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. This test is applied with a 
fair degree of precision: the courts have held that it is unacceptable to 
arrest a person in the company of someone committing a crime;108 in the 
vicinity of a crime or in a high-crime area;109 for speaking out of 
frustration in a way that does not constitute a threat;110 engaging in an 
activity a police officer could not identify as a crime;111 or on the basis of 
an unsubstantiated, uninvestigated tip from a private citizen.112 The 
courts have also held that it is not acceptable to keep a person in 
investigative detention longer than is needed to secure evidence,113 and 
have stressed that police officers must exercise their legal authority 
within strict boundaries.114 It would follow that some limitations on the 
exercise of legal authority should also apply to segregation placements. 
Such limitations, however, are rarely considered in the prison context. 
By extending deference to prison authorities on matters of placement, the 
courts not only permit CSC to circumvent liability for unlawful or 
unwarranted segregation placements, they also obscure the institutional 
structures of power at play. In practice, CSC rarely provides adequate 
reasons for placing prisoners in segregation. Placement decisions are often 
made on the basis of anonymous and unsubstantiated source information, 
even when this information is questionable or unreliable.115 When CSC 
provides written reasons for segregation placements, these reasons are often 
vague and imprecise.116 Piché and Major describe an account in which an 
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116 Interview #2, id., at 51, at lines 10-19. 
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83-year-old prisoner was threatened with segregation because he agreed to 
give another prisoner an ice cream bar if he would make his bed in the 
mornings, a task the older prisoner was physically unable to do.117 Their 
study further shows that CSC has segregated prisoners for public displays of 
affection, refusing to be searched by prison staff of the opposite sex, and not 
cleaning cells.118 While such infractions may warrant some measure of 
punishment, such punishment should not be so severe as to constitute what, 
if improperly enforced or lasts longer than 15 days, is a form of torture.119  
The lawyers and advocates interviewed for this project noted that 
within the prison walls, it is well known that prison officials often 
provide “official” reasons that differ from the true reasons behind certain 
segregation placements.120 When doing so, CSC frequently hides behind 
its lawful right to withhold information in order to preserve the safety 
and security of the institution, even when safety and security are not at 
stake.121 This tactic is deployed for a variety of reasons, whether as a 
punitive tool or a means to pressure prisoners to provide information 
about others.122 One lawyer recounted a situation where an assaulted 
prisoner refused to identify his assailant. CSC staff placed him in 
segregation on the basis that his safety could not be assured as the 
assailant was unknown. It later became clear that these same staff knew 
the identity of the assailant from the outset, and segregated the prisoner 
in order to extract more information about the incident.123 This tendency 
has long been documented. As Debra Parkes and Kim Pate explain, for 
CSC, “the entitlements of prisoners, whether legislative or constitutional, 
can be ignored or restricted when a security concern is implicated, no 
matter how important or fundamental the right and how tangential or 
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120 Interview #3 (June 18, 2015), at 7, lines 24-25. 
121 Id., referencing CCRA, supra, note 1, s. 27(3): 
Except in relation to decisions on disciplinary offences, where the Commissioner has 
reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of information under subsection (1) or (2) 
would jeopardize 
(a) the safety of any person, 
(b) the security of a penitentiary, or 
(c) the conduct of any lawful investigation, 
the Commissioner may authorize the withholding from the offender of as much 
information as is strictly necessary in order to protect the interest identified in paragraph 
(a), (b) or (c). 
122 Interview #8, (July 23, 2015), at 9, at lines 18-20; Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 10; 
Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 23, lines 9-17; Interview #10 (July 20, 2015), at 5, lines 16-20. 
123 Interview #1 (June 2, 2015), at 7-9. 
(2018) 84 S.C.L.R. (2d) TORT OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT 61 
speculative the security concern.”124 In reality, CSC almost always has 
final say with respect to the narrative of events that is accepted as “fact”. 
Where these reasons do not coincide with reality, the blanket citation of 
security concerns may prevent meaningful review and oversight.125  
At best, the approach adopted in Abbot and Hill can be criticized for 
showing undue deference to CSC. At worse, it can be criticized for 
sanctioning the unwarranted rights violations of the plaintiffs involved. 
Deferring to the discretionary authority of prison officials, even where 
evidence shows that such authority was improperly exercised, strays 
from the requirements of the legal authority defence. It not only fails to 
hold CSC accountable for unlawful conduct, but also risks authorizing 
the very violations of liberty and autonomy the tort of false 
imprisonment was designed to protect. The legal authority defence 
should compel courts to meaningfully interrogate CSC’s reasons for 
placement. To do otherwise would be to reinforce the inequalities that 
plague the administrative segregation regime, and to perpetuate the 
already severe imbalance of power between CSC and prisoner-plaintiffs, 
not to mention the vast majority of unjustly segregated prisoners who do 
not have the chance to have their case heard by a court of law. 
V. DEVALUING THE LIBERTY INTERESTS OF THE PRISONER 
The second striking pattern that emerges from this data set comes from 
the courts’ approach to the determination of damages. Five reported cases 
have issued damages in false imprisonment caused by segregation.126 In 
each, the courts issued strikingly low sums, generally set at the paltry rate of 
$10 compensation for every day of unlawful segregation. This formulation 
                                                                                                                       
124 Debra Parkes & Kim Pate, “Time for Accountability: Effective Oversight of Women’s 
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125 Interview #2 (June 2, 2015), at 37, lines 22-23. 
126 Notably, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged in McArthur, supra, note 94, that 
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comes from the Federal Court of Canada’s 1987 decision in LeBar v. 
Canada, which, while not a segregation case, has nonetheless set the 
standard for quantifying damages in the segregation context.127 LeBar 
involved a claim in false imprisonment brought by a prisoner to contest a 43-
day delay in his release. On the facts, the Court found CSC liable in both 
false imprisonment and negligence, and assessed the quantification of 
damages at length. The question turned on the value to be accorded to  
Mr. LeBar’s liberty rights, in relation to which the Court reasoned as follows:  
Liberty is sweet. Some folk assert that liberty is essential for human 
fulfillment and happiness. … Liberty, however, is a conditional right. 
One can forfeit it by personal misconduct, or waive it by the free, 
informed consent of oneself, or even that of the majority of Canadians 
in times of great and dangerous emergency. In the above cited 
jurisprudence all of the plaintiffs appeared to be individuals who, all 
their lives, prized, cherished and respected their own liberty. All were, 
in that regard, very differently situated from the plaintiff herein.128 
In the Court’s opinion, Mr. LeBar had failed to properly cherish his 
liberty, and had “squandered” it by engaging in criminal activities.129 As 
such, the Court dismissed his liberty as “self-devalued”, “cheap”, 
“despised”, and “self-cheapened”.130 Ultimately, it held that Mr. LeBar’s 
liberty was simply not worth as much as that of the free man, concluding 
that his liberty “counts for something, but … not much.”131 The Court 
therefore compensated Mr. LeBar only for lost earning potential.132 At 
the time, this rate was fixed to $5 a day. Doubling this quantum to $10 a 
day, the Court awarded Mr. LeBar $430 in general damages for his  
43 days of unlawful confinement.133 The Court also awarded $10,000 in 
punitive damages to punish CSC for what it concluded amounted to 
oppressive and abusive conduct.134  
Despite the legal and material differences between imprisonment and 
segregation, the courts have nonetheless applied the LeBar standard  
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in the administrative segregation cases, with only a few exceptions.135 In 
Brandon,136 for example, the plaintiff was found with a female staff 
member in an unauthorized area. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 22 
days of punitive dissociation, a form of segregation, by discipline court. 
After seven days, the remaining sentence was suspended, but the plaintiff 
was kept in dissociation for an additional 40 days. After another 
conversation with a female staff member some time later, the plaintiff was 
placed in administrative segregation for an additional 28 days. The Court 
held that the plaintiff was falsely imprisoned on the basis that CSC could 
not prove that the additional time spent in segregation was justified. The 
Court did not discuss the harms caused to the plaintiff, but simply awarded 
$680 in general damages for 68 days of unlawful confinement.137  
Saint-Jacques follows a similar pattern. This case involved a claim by a 
plaintiff who was placed in administrative segregation for 80 days after 
refusing to take a tuberculosis test following a transfer from another facility. 
The plaintiff refused to take this particular test on the basis of an allergy, and 
agreed to all other forms of testing. Finding in favour of the plaintiff, the 
Court held that CSC could not justify the segregation, as the plaintiff’s 
refusal to take the test did not pose a threat to the order and discipline of the 
institution. The Court also found that CSC had failed to conduct the required 
30-day reviews. It rebuked CSC for its “oppressive and arbitrary actions”, 
and awarded the plaintiff $2,000 in punitive damages. As for general 
damages, the Court awarded only a trifling $800. In line with LeBar, the 
Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s liberty was simply not worth much, on the 
basis that had he “not been kept in administrative segregation, the plaintiff 
would not have been at liberty like any law-abiding individual, but would 
still have been an inmate in a penitentiary.”138 
Since the tort of false imprisonment does not ask the court to assess 
whether the plaintiff’s liberty is “deserving” of compensation, there is no 
principled basis for differentiating the liberty of the imprisoned from the 
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liberty of the free. Since its earliest inception in the thirteenth century, false 
imprisonment was designed to serve an emancipatory purpose.139 An 
instantiation of the writ of trespass vi et armis — or trespass on the person 
— it was conceived as a means by which disempowered plaintiffs would 
be compensated for forceful deprivations of liberty by more powerful 
defendants.140 False imprisonment began as an action to protect the 
individual liberty of disenfranchised serfs in England, with the earliest 
cases in the thirteenth century.141 Henry de Bracton, who authored the first 
systematic analysis of English common law, remarked in 1229 that false 
imprisonment was designed to protect against deprivations of liberty.142 
From the late fifteenth to the early sixteenth century, false 
imprisonment moved from targeting lords and landowners towards the 
abuse of police and judicial power — an orientation that endures 
today.143 Even in its earliest iterations the tort was actionable per se, and 
punitive damages were available in its application.144 This bears out the 
historical logic that false imprisonment has always intended to serve 
compensatory, punitive, and deterring purposes. In its contemporary 
iteration, the tort is driven by the same underlying goals.145  
To that end, the case law provides some examples of courts issuing 
punitive damages for the purpose of condemning or deterring 
inappropriate action by CSC. In Abbot, for example, after the initial 
segregation described above, CSC segregated the plaintiff for 100 
additional days, several months after the incident at issue, 
notwithstanding that all charges against him had been dropped. The 
Court imposed liability in false imprisonment for these 100 days, finding 
“no basis in law or in fact [for keeping] the plaintiff in segregation”.146 
The Court’s findings are scathing: it rebuked CSC for its “bald-face lie”, 
noting that the paperwork used to justify this segregation placement 
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was fabricated and embellished, that prison authorities were “way out 
of line,” and that “someone, somewhere was being malicious.”147 
Appropriately, the Court awarded $10,000 in punitive damages for 
CSC’s “oppressive”, “abusive”, and “malicious” conduct. As with Saint-
Jacques, however, the Court focused almost exclusively on punishing 
CSC, rather than compensating the plaintiff. Adopting LeBar, the Court 
awarded the plaintiff only $1,000 in general damages for these same 
100 days. The broader normative and legal effects of this award are 
significant. Punitive damages are non-compensatory by nature, and are 
awarded to “punish the defendant when his conduct has been particularly 
vicious, premeditated, high handed, or disgraceful”.148 While high 
punitive damage awards send an important message to CSC, paltry 
general damage awards send an equally important message to plaintiffs, 
namely, the violations of their rights simply do not count for much.  
This approach to the determination of damages is also troubling in its 
failure to give meaning to one of the most basic principles of Canadian 
tort law: that damage awards must strive to put the plaintiff in the 
position they would have been in had the harm not occurred.149 
Compensating a segregated prisoner for lost wages does little to restore 
them to their original position, and ignores what Adjin-Tettey refers to as 
“the primacy of plaintiffs’ rights under Canadian tort law”.150 A growing 
body of literature suggests that the harms of segregation are not always 
alleviated upon release, and can plague prisoners forever. Summarizing 
this research, the Court in BCCLA concluded that many prisoners  
are likely to suffer permanent harm as a result of their confinement. 
This harm is most commonly manifested by a continued intolerance of 
social interaction, which has repercussions for inmates’ ability to 
successfully readjust to the social environment of the prison general 
population and to the broader community upon release from prison.151  
These accounts accord with Jackson’s research, which points to the 
severe psychological after-effects of segregation, particularly the potential 
for post-traumatic stress.152 His research shows that segregation continues 
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to impact prisoners’ relationships with other inmates and staff, as well as 
with family members.153 Piché and Major state that segregation can 
“permanently scar individuals”, and that its ramifications “often extend 
well beyond the time prisoners spend in isolation.”154 They note that even 
after release, prisoners continue to experience “perceptual distortions and 
hallucinations, affective disturbances, difficulty with thinking, memory 
and concentration difficulties, disturbances of thought content, and 
problems with impulse control”.155 Importantly as well, segregation may 
impact a prisoner’s prospects for rehabilitation, be it with respect to their 
security re-classification status, program participation, or conditional 
release outcomes.156 A damage award based on LeBar’s $10/day standard 
does nothing to address the broader effects that segregation has on the life 
of the individual. For the law of tort to meet the goal of restoring 
the plaintiff’s original condition, courts should weigh evidence of the long-
term impact of segregation on the individual — both as regards their 
mental health and rehabilitation prospects — and award damages not just 
for harms suffered but also for cost of future care. In cases involving 
Indigenous plaintiffs, courts should assess such evidence mindful of the 
pervasive violence and systemic prejudices faced by Indigenous prisoners 
in corrections, and assess damages accordingly. 
Outside the prison context, courts have compensated plaintiffs 
considerably more effectively in false imprisonment cases. In its 1969 
decision in Bahner, for example, the British Columbia Supreme Court 
awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in general damages and an additional $2,000 
in punitive damages in false imprisonment for wrongful detention and 
public humiliation.157 The plaintiff, described by the Court as “young, 
lively, educated and intelligent”, was arrested for intoxication in a public 
place while dining at a hotel restaurant, notwithstanding the fact that he 
“was not in any way or at any time even slightly intoxicated.”158 The 
arrest occurred in view of the public, after the plaintiff and his friend 
refused to pay for a bottle of wine they did not drink. The Court took 
issue with the defendants’ needlessly callous conduct, and justified the 
high damage award on the basis that the “degradation consequent upon 
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the experience suffered by the plaintiff is sore and not easily 
forgotten.”159 In its 1975 decision in Dalsin et al. v. T. Eaton Co. Canada 
Ltd., the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench awarded the plaintiffs $2,000 in 
compensatory and exemplary damages for being falsely accused of 
stealing a pair of jeans.160 Both plaintiffs were held for roughly 
30 minutes in the backroom of a department store, during which they 
were mistreated, insulted, and berated. The Court justified the high 
damage award in this case by noting the intense humiliation suffered by 
the plaintiffs, including the “stares of onlookers as they left the store.”161 
This pattern emerges from a number of additional cases: $2,000 in 
general damages for the laying of an unsubstantiated criminal charge,162 
$2,700 in general damages for being falsely accused of stealing groceries 
and detained for 45 minutes,163 and $4,000 in general damages for a 
deeply humiliating detention lasting 45 minutes on suspected shoplifting 
charges.164 
Other courts have issued far more significant damage awards in cases 
involving more intense humiliation. Given the factual specificity of these 
cases, it is worth canvassing a few in detail. For example, in a 1997 case 
involving three young girls who were arrested by police in a “traumatic 
manner” on the basis of an unsubstantiated tip that they had stolen a 
teddy bear, the court awarded each plaintiff $10,000 in damages, to 
compensate for the “extreme emotional abuse” and “continuing mistrust 
and fear of the police.”165 In 1999, in a case arising from a lengthy and 
unlawful detention at a department store involving handcuffing, 
humiliation, and excessive force, the Court awarded $23,000 in damages 
to compensate the plaintiff for the indignity he suffered.166 In a 2012 case 
involving a plaintiff who was wrongly detained and handcuffed in a 
hospital while visiting his mother during her chemotherapy treatment, 
and later taken into police custody, the Court awarded $15,000 in 
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damages to compensate for trauma, suffering, and humiliation.167 In a 
2014 case, the Court ordered $25,000 to a plaintiff for wrongful arrest 
and detention by police including handcuffing, strip-searching, and other 
humiliating treatment.168 In perhaps the most extreme example, in a 2013 
case, the Court awarded $50,000 to a medical professional who was 
involuntarily detained for psychiatric care for unsubstantiated reasons.169 
While the analysis in each of these cases is very fact-specific, a clear 
trend emerges: when compensating the false imprisonment of the free, 
courts are far more likely to award high general damage awards. These 
cases place significant value on the harm caused to the individual, even 
when the violations to liberty and autonomy are less extreme than in the 
prison setting. Courts are much more likely to compensate the 
unincarcerated for public embarrassment, humiliation, insult, or 
mistreatment, and to consider evidence of injury to feelings and 
reputation when doing so. On the whole, and in contrast, in the prison 
context courts do not fairly compensate — or even recognize — the 
harms suffered by prisoners in unlawful segregation, and reject the very 
premise that a prisoner’s liberty should count as much as the liberty of 
the free. Seen in this light, the damages issued in the prison cases emerge 
not just as callous, but also as unprincipled.  
The tort of false imprisonment is designed to protect from 
unwarranted invasions of one’s person. It is a means by which courts 
can regulate social interactions, and ensure that legal authority is not 
used to deprive plaintiffs of liberty interests without justification. 
Those liberty interests are just as worthy of protection in the darkest 
corners of the prison, where tort law rarely goes. As Louise Arbour 
reminds: “When a right has been granted by law, it is no less important 
that such right be respected because the person entitled to it is a 
prisoner.”170 By showing undue deference to the discretionary 
authority of prison officials, and devaluing the liberty interests of 
prisoners rights in the assessment of damages, the courts fail to heed 
Arbour’s important words. For the tort of false imprisonment to 
achieve its progressive potential, courts must “resist the temptation to 
trivialize the infringement of prisoners’ rights as either an insignificant 
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infringement of rights, or as an infringement of the rights of people 
who do not deserve any better”,171 and embrace a jurisprudential shift 
in the determination of administrative segregation cases.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
There are many barriers that might prevent prisoners from bringing 
tort claims to contest unlawful segregation. Access to justice remains a 
persistent problem. Prisoners often have limited financial resources, and 
legal aid typically does not cover legal assistance for civil remedies. 
Many also face additional barriers, like marginalization, poverty, low 
literacy, or mental illness, which might inhibit their ability to reach out 
for assistance.172 Prisoners are also institutionally marginalized, and as 
Parkes reminds, profoundly “vulnerable to majoritarian indifference and 
excesses of state power”.173 The institutional environment of the prison 
discourages legal action, providing few resources for self-advocacy, 
limited access to legal calls and visits, and, at times, further burdening 
would-be plaintiffs with the active dissuasion of ad hoc segregation 
terms meted out by correctional staff.174 Prisoners may also view the 
legal system with cynicism and mistrust, and may not believe in its 
ability to compensate or otherwise assist them.175   
Despite these barriers, tort law offers a viable means through which 
plaintiffs can challenge the improper use of segregation in the daily 
management of corrections. Even if the BCCLA decision is upheld on 
appeal, and the safeguards it outlines are effectively implemented, 
segregation will continue to be used improperly and give rise to 
unimaginable harms. As Adjin-Tettey notes, if tort law is to advance the 
goals of justice, it must value and protect plaintiff rights in ways that are 
attentive to their unique circumstances, as situated in larger systems of 
power and violence.176 Against the backdrop of BCCLA, every new tort 
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case presents an opportunity for prisoner plaintiffs to provide a first-hand 
account of their experiences. Such evidence could trigger a judicial shift 
in the understanding of the lived experience of segregation, as well as 
broader structures that enable and perpetuate its violence. In time, this 
shift might enable judges to compensate plaintiffs more effectively for 
the harms suffered in segregation. With its broad focus on all manners of 
unlawful imprisonment, the tort can also be used to contest segregation-
like placements that are not legally classified as solitary confinement, but 
that closely resemble it in practice. Substantial damage awards might 
compel CSC to shift its institutional culture and ensure greater adherence 
to the rule of law in the daily management of segregation. A judicial shift 
away from excessive deference and the devaluation of prisoner rights in 
the assessment of damages could not only bring a sea change in the law 
of torts, it could also advance the law’s promise to protect the dignity, 
autonomy, and liberty interests of all persons. To do otherwise would be 
to risk authorizing the very violations of liberty and autonomy the tort of 
false imprisonment was designed to prevent. 
